TRRRIIIMMM…….. TRRRIIIMMM……..
ALARM BELLS RINGING FOR US……..
MK Shaji, General
Secretary, AILRSA, SCR.
Dear
Locomen,
This is probably one of the last
chances for us, my dear loco running brother, to get up from the slumber and
act. The much awaited VII CPC was
constituted and AILRSA has submitted a detailed memorandum to it, followed by a
short interview in Bangalore.
The
recognized trade unions viz., NFIR & AIRF also submitted their views. After going through its contents, now the
loco running staff wish it would have been much better had they not submitted
any memorandum to the VII CPC at all.
Such is the extent of damage NFIR & AIRF had done to Loco Running
Staff. The demands of trade unions may
not normally get accepted as-it-is at the hands of the CPC. But a trade union should atleast know what
to demand. Otherwise they are deemed as
a failure. Time and again, CPCs after
CPCs, the AIRF & NFIR have consistently proved that they do not even know
what to demand and they care a damn for loco running staff. Let us now understand what is in store for us
if the VII CPC accepts the demands of AIRF & NFIR.
RAW DEAL STARTS WITH ALPs
Both AIRF & NFIR demanded GP of Rs.2800 for Assistant Loco Pilots,
which they sought for other categories of the matriculates/ITI certificate
holders. Here the job attributes and
other aspects such as highest medical classification and continuance in that
category till retirement etc. were ignored.
AIRF quoted Sr.ALP as next promotion to ALPs, thus misleading the 7th
CPC that the upgraded post as a promotional post. Unfortunately they do not
even understand the difference between upgradation and promotion. NFIR demanded
diploma as basic educational qualification for ALPs but failed to demand
GP/Scale accordingly. For JEs, who have
a basic educational qualification of diploma, NFIR demanded an enhanced scale
of Rs.74000 which is equivalent to a GP of Rs.4800. In other words NFIR felt that running staff
need to be paid 60% less than others.
Moral- The principal of “EQUAL
PAY FOR EQUAL QUALIFICATION” is not for ALPs.
SHUNTERS SHUNTED OUT
Loco Pilot (Shunting) is a
functional and promotional post. But
federations now merged it with ALP and both Federations demanded the scale of
Rs.46000 which equates to present GP of Rs.2800. Thus there is a risk of abolition of Shunter
category in the future. At the same time
various posts, such as Tech.II, ESM-II, Sr.TTE/TTE etc. which are already equal
to LP(Shunting) with a present GP of Rs.2400 have been demanded for elevation
to the GP of Rs.4200, discriminating LP(Shunting) in whose case the Federations
have demanded a GP of only Rs.2800.
ENTRY GRADE ASST. STATION MASTER = MAIL LP
For Loco Pilot (Goods) the
Federations demanded mere replacement scale equal to a GP of Rs.4200 whereas
for many other categories (such as JE/Master Technician, Chief Telephone
Operator, Master Cook, Head Ticket Examiner, Dy. Station Manager who are also
presently in the GP of Rs.4200) they demanded enhanced scales (i.e., Rs.74000)
equivalent to the GP of Rs.4800. An
entry grade Assistant Station Master who is currently in a GP of Rs.2800 also
has been put up for a hike to the GP of Rs.4200, in which GP even a LP
(M&E) is presently placed. Even
after issuance of corrigendum by the Federations, the above position remains
same.
TOUGH JOB, HENCE LESS PAY!
In the case of a Motorman / Loco
Pilot (Pass.) the Federations have demanded the scale of Rs.65000/-, which is
less by Rs.1000 than the normal replacement scale Rs.66000 for a GP of
Rs.4600. Instead of asking for an
enhanced scale of GP Rs.4600, they opted to suppress the Loco Pilot (Pass.)
category by Rs.1000 by creating an additional scale of pay. The justification given by the AIRF is that
“As an exceptional case, an additional scale of pay is proposed to the category
of Running Staff, in view of promotion, which involves selection, training and
handling passenger carrying trains. In
the case of Motorman, the staff has to pass Aptitude/Psycho test also”. The verbatim used by the NFIR for such a
suppression is also almost the same! (Copy Cats! When they do not know what to demand for loco
running staff, they could have very well copied AILRSA memorandum to the VII
CPC). For such an important category
they opted to compliment with a cut of Rs.1000!
NO PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCED SCALE/GP FOR LP(M&E)
In the case of LP (M&E), the
NFIR had remarked that the Railways had agreed to give a GP of Rs.4600, but the
Ministry of Finance have not yet approved.
While things stand so, the NFIR failed to demand enhanced scale of
Rs.78000 (equivalent to GP of Rs.5400) which they demanded for other categories
who are presently in a GP of Rs.4600.
REALISE
THE INTENTIONAL PROPOSALS FOR LOW SCALES/GP
AIRF/NFIR Demand
before the Departmental Anomaly Committee(DAC) & 7th CPC
Designation
|
AIRF/NFIR demand before the DAC
|
Present demand before the 7th CPC
|
Remarks
|
Loco Pilot
(Goods)
|
Grade Pay Rs.4600
|
56000
(equal to
Rs.4200)
|
One stage below DAC demand
|
Loco Pilot
(Pass)/Motorman
|
Grade Pay Rs.4800
|
65000
(Less than
Rs.4600)
|
One stage +Rs.1000
Less than DAC demand
|
Loco Pilot
(Mail)
|
Grade Pay Rs.5400
|
74000
(equal to
Rs.4800)
|
One stage below DAC demand
|
Most condemnably, both the Federations, deliberately scaled down their
own demand placed before the Departmental Anomaly Committee (DAC). It is to be taken note that they demanded a
GP of Rs.4600, 4800 and 5400 for LP(Goods), LP(Pass.) and LP(M&E)
respectively before the DAC. In an
orchestrated attempt to let down the loco running staff, both the Federations
had demanded for a GP of Rs.4200, less than 4600 (since the proposed additional
scale beginning with Rs.65000 is less by Rs.1000) and 4800 for LP(Goods),
LP(Pass.) and LP(M&E) respectively. Had the Federations not demanded GP of
Rs.4600, 4800 and 5400 for LP(Goods), LP(Pass.) and LP(M&E) respectively
before the DAC, we could have considered the present reduced pay proposal before
the VII CPC as a slip/error. But having
demanded the above GPs before the DAC, it is abundantly clear that the
Federations are out to cut our pay packet intentionally and accordingly scaled
down their pay proposals placed before the VII CPC.
RUNNING ALLOWANCE AT THE MERCY OF THE RAILWAY BOARD
The NFIR wholly left the issue of
running allowance to the wisdom of Railway administration, whereas the AIRF
demanded it to be decided by bilateral agreement between the Railways and
Federations. Those who are not required
to drive locomotives, but remain present in the cab have been projected to get
a higher additional allowance of Rs.2000/2500.
DAMAGE CONTROL DAMAGES FURTHER
As the loco running staff got a
shock from the Federations, staff spontaneously came out in open challenging
the wrong pay proposals of the Federations.
Left with no other option, both the Federations hurried into a damage
control effort by sending a corrigendum to the Pay Commission. While nobody knows whether it really reached
O/O the Pay Commission, it is suggestive that both the Federations had issued a
corrigendum on the same date i.e., 08th September 2014! Unity in
Diversity (read as Unity in fooling)! Believe it or not, crux of both the
Federations corrigendum is also the same!! (wah re wah!). Now let us see what the Federations demanded
in their corrigendum dated 08-09-2014.
The worst hit category of Assistant Loco Pilot again got a raw deal from
both the Federations and they opted not to demand any suitable enhanced
GP/Scale for them in the corrigendum as well.
For both, Shunter and Senior Shunter, the Federations have now sought a
revised pay scale of Rs.56000 (equivalent to GP Rs.4200). Upgraded post of
Senior Shunter thus stands happily surrendered by both Federations. For all Loco Pilots i.e, Goods, Passenger and
Mail & Express, the Federations demanded an enhanced scale of Rs.74,000
(which corresponds to GP of Rs.4800).
One may wonder why one Loco Pilot (Goods) should take up further promotion
if there is no higher scale is in the offing.
Some LP(Goods) are wise enough to decline promotion and officiate in
higher grade to draw officiating allowance, which is financially better than
effecting a promotion. One of the main
heartburn for the loco running staff since 6th CPC was that all the
LPs were put in the same scale/GP, though the post of LP(Pass.) and LP(M&E)
are considered to be promotions. Though
the Federations remarked loco running staff as “frontline staff of the Indian
Railways” a back seat proposal was prepared even in the corrigendum by the
Federations, which shows their deliberate onslaught on loco running men.
WHY THE FEDERATIONS DID THESE INJUSTICES TO LOCO RUNNING STAFF?
Let us examine why the recognized
Federations adopted a stand of betrayal of loco running staff. To understand this aspect we need to have a
look at the history. Your kind attention
is drawn to the book named “THE INDIAN
RAILWAYS STRIKE OF 1974 - A Study of Power and Organised Labour” authored by Mr Stephen Sherlock, which
was originally a doctoral thesis for the University of Sydney. This book was prepared primarily based on
Trade Union Publications, Pamphlets, Conference Papers, other publications,
Party Publications, Government Publications, Private Papers, Newspapers and
Newsmagazines, interviews (which included leaders of NFIR & AIRF as well),
other primary sources and secondary sources. The Bibliography alone runs into
23 pages! One will find reliance to them
aplenty in almost every page in the 475 pages lengthy book content.
Excerpts from
“THE INDIAN RAILWAYS STRIKE OF 1974
-A Study of Power and Organised Labour”
*CHEATED AFFILIANT UNION AND AIRF GOT RECOGNITION
Pages 42-43:- “The watershed in relations between the
Railway Board and the AIRF was the 1930 strike in the Great Indian Peninsular
Railway. The strike was called by the Great Indian Peninsular Railwaymen’s Union,
the most communist-influenced of the unions affiliated to the AIRF. The Railway dismissed a large number of
workers, singling out communist supporters, and began negotiations with the
conservative sections of the AIRF. The
AIRF reached an agreement to end the strike under which some, but not all, of the dismissed workers
were to be reinstated. When the Railway violated the terms of the
agreement, the communists attempted to continue the strike but were
defeated by heavy repression, including the killing of two workers in police
firings. The communists’ position in the
AIRF was severely weakened. The Federation was granted official recognition
by the Railway Board in return for its assistance in ending the strike”.
*AIRF STRIKE BROKEN & NFIR GETS RECOGNITION
Pages 43-44:- “…The NFIR was established in 1948 by Indian National Congress leaders…..The
truth is probably that although some sections of management were not keen on
facilitating the establishment of a second federation, the Railway Board could
not resist the weight of persistent Congress pressure. The
issue was decided in 1949 when the NFIR supported the management during a
strike called by the AIRF. The NFIR was
recognised soon after….”
*TRADING UNIONS
Page 50:- “The recognized unions were made avenues of corruption by their leaders’
practices. Having eschewed the
tradition of collective action, they turned to taking up the grievances of
individual workers on petition. It was not long before money was often
demanded for the service. The unions
became the means through which a worker could obtain a promotion, a transfer or
a favourable hearing in disciplinary proceedings – so long as sufficient money
changed hands. The recognized unions
became known as “trading unions” “.
Eschew=To
keep away from ; shun.
*PNM & JCM – TO MINIMISE CONTACT WITH LABOUR
Page 53:- “The principal means by which the recognized
unions communicated with management at the various levels was through bodies
called the Permanent Negotiating Machinery and the Joint Consultative
Machinery. The Permanent Negotiating
Machinery was established in 1952 “for maintaining contact with labour and
resolving disputes and differences which may arise between them and the
Administration”. In fact, it was not designed to maintain but to minimise “contact with
labour” by declaring certain specified organizations to the labour’s official
and only voice……..In 1966 the government also set up the Joint Consultative
Machinery for all government departments and departmental undertakings……..”
*PNM & JCM – TO WATER DOWN ORIGINAL DEMANDS
Page 55:- “Institutions such as the
Permanent Negotiating Machinery, the Joint Consultative Machinery and
officially recognised unions had the
effect of bureaucratizing management-labour interaction. Negotiations were taken from the hands of
rank and file workers and placed in the care of a professionalised trade union
leadership……… the union leaders were
full-time functionaries separated from the daily experience of the railway
workers themselves. The bureaucratized
union leadership had a vested interest in the stability and permanence of the
institutions which underpinned its position and influence. It was forced to moderate the intensity of
workers’ demands to the level which was acceptable to management. If the union leadership failed to do so it
would find itself derecognised and outside the system upon which it depended….”
*WITH REGARD TO THE STRIKE BEGUN ON
25-07-1967 & 05-07-1968
Pages 58-65:- “Hawkers
of coconuts and peanuts who clustered around railway stations were brought in
to be used as second firemen and coal khalasis
and casual railway labourers were employed as first firemen….The Firemen’s
Council refused to call for a return to work until it had received an
assurance, directly from the Railway Minister or from the General Manager of
the Southern Railway, that there would be no victimization. Only when the assurance was received, two
days later, did the Council tell its supporters to go back to work. The Firemen’s Council took special note of
the fact that the Railway Minister had also given an assurance from the floor
of the parliament……The Firemen’s Council
had established itself as a new, militant pole of attraction in the railway
workers’ movement……During the mass sick leave agitation a number of Council
leaders had published a pamphlet revealing that railway passengers’ safety had
been put at risk through the use of unqualified people to operate
locomotives. On the grounds that they
had revealed government secrets to the public, the Trichy Divisional Secretary
and President of the Firemen’s Council were dismissed from railway
service. During the subsequent twelve
months about ten other firemen’s leaders were victimised on various pretexts
for their activities in the Council. Two
hundred firemen from Trichy were penalised………The strategy was to harass
Firemen’s Council leaders to prevent the union functioning on a day-to-day
basis and to penalise rank and file firemen who might participate in its
campaigns……..After futile attempts to appeal directly to both the Railway
Minister and the Deputy Railway Minister, the Firemen’s Council launched
another agitation on 5 July 1968…….A Railway spokesman told press that 2,500 of
the 3,000 firemen in the affected Southern Railway divisions were absent and
1,300 of the 1,700 in the South Central Railway divisions. Management
first enlisted the support of the recognised unions to attempt to persuade the
firemen to give up the strike…………Fearing a deepening confrontation the
politicians once again intervened. The
Chief Ministers of the four states concerned, Tamil Nadu, Mysore, Andhra
Pradesh and Kerala, were in Delhi for a meeting at the time. They met together and deputed the Kerala
Chief Minister, E.M.S.Namboodiripad, to meet with the Prime Minister and urge
her to intervene to bring about a settlement. Indira Gandhi promised to “look into the
demands”. The Minister of State for Railways, Parimal Ghosh, had already
suggested that the government might agree in principle to the firemen’s main
demand of a reduction of maximum working hours to twelve per day if there was
an immediate return to work. However, at
a meeting with the two recognised unions, Ghosh drew up an agreement limiting
the firemen’s maximum hours of work to fourteen………… The Railway Minster
promised not to victimise participants and personally to take up the cases of
Council leaders who had been victimised as a result of previous union
activities. The agitation was called off
on 18 July……………The two strikes
demonstrated that the Firemen’s Council, and not the recognised unions, was the
organization to which the workers in that particular category looked for
leadership. The Firemen’s Council
had grown in strength during the year between the two strikes…….The much
greater impact of the 1968 campaign was evidenced by the fact that it forced not
only the Railway Minister, but also four Chief Ministers and Prime Minister to
take action. The strength of Firemen’s
Council lay in its closeness to rank and file workers. It was built and led by rail workers and was
organized from the shopfloor…….The
leaders of the recognised unions were regarded as corrupt and
self-seeking. The leaders of the
Firemen’s Council, in contrast, gained nothing for their work in the union
except victimization from management.
During the period under
discussion, many Council leaders were suspended from work for longer periods
than they had worked. The Firemen’s Council was an attempt to
build a union run directly by rank and file workers rather than by professional
intermediaries.”
*YOU FIGHT, I CLAIM THE BENEFITS !
Pages 66-67:- “The
pattern of events in the strikes of 1967 and 1968 was revealingly similar. On both occasions management refused to
negotiate with an unrecognised union, used the recognised unions to try to end
the agitation and mobilized a repressive operation. The repression was sanctioned by government
through police support and by allowing the agitation to be declared an illegal
strike. Finally, the recognised unions, which had proved incapable of influencing the
firemen’s actions, were used as the medium through which concessions were made,
to bolster their official status as the workers’ only representatives. The
perception amongst worker-activists in the Firemen Council that the government,
management and the recognised unions were co-operating against the workers’
interests was confirmed. It strengthened their resolve to continue with the
project of building an independent, category-based union.”
*LOCO RUNNING STAFF CONFERENCES – MOCKERY BY FEDERATIONS
Page 72:- “Two factors arising from the Firemen’s
Council agitation were important in bringing the two groups# together. The first was the conduct of the recognised
unions. Various groups of loco running
staff had approached the recognised unions in the preceding years to address
their particular grievances. In
response, the recognised unions held a number of conferences between 1965 and
1967 on the problems of loco running staff.
The outcome of the conferences was, according to loco running staff
activist, M.Arumai, the “mere passing of
resolutions and extraction of money from the loco running staff”………..The recognised unions had been uninterested
in taking firm action and had been hostile when the firemen had done so. They dissociated themselves from the
campaigns and were clearly regarded by management as another tool for forcing a
return to work.”
# The
Firemen Council and Loco Running Staff Association.
*BIRTH OF AILRSA
Page 73-77:- “Finally,
when it appeared to the Firemen’s Council, during the 1968 strike, that the
government was willing to give ground and agree to a twelve-hour day, the Recognized
unions stepped in and made an agreement for fourteen hours………..Supporters
of the Firemen’s Council, however, regarded the agreement as a “total betrayal and a cheap sell out” and
relations between the Council and the Recognized unions were, from that time
on, irreconcilably embittered. This
situation helped bring the two groups of locomotive staff together because it
convinced them that they could depend on nothing but their own resources…………..The
second factor which became important in bringing the firemen and drivers
together was management’s ability to undermine a strike in a divided workforce
by using strike-breaking labour and the Territorial Army………It was obvious that
their united action would be far more effective than separate campaigns. The prevailing sentiment in favour of unity
was given concrete expression in a six-day strike from 10 to 15 May 1970. The drivers and shunters of the Loco Running
Staff Association joined with the firemen and engine cleaners of the Firemen’s
Council in a combined action which embraced the whole of the Southern
Railway. The strike followed what was by
now a fairly predictable course. The workers were confronted with a common
front of hostility from management and the Recognized unions……….. The
strike was eventually called off after parleys between the Chief Minister of
Tamil Nadu and the Railway Minister……..No progress was made over the larger
issues such as working hours, but the Railway Minister agreed that diesel
training should be conducted in regional languages and the “box boys” should be
employed to do jobs such as carrying the “line box”. The most important achievement of the May
1970 strike was its role in facilitating the unity of the firemen and
drivers……..The formal unity of the two
organizations was cemented with the formation of the All-India Loco Running
Staff Association at a conference at Vijayawada in August 1970.”
*PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD WAS BETTER !
Page 77:- “The central demand of the agitations of
1967, 1968 and 1970 was for the reduction of working hours. Many
of the British-run railways before 1947 had classified the loco running staff’s
duty as “intensive” which meant that there was a strict limit on their
hours of work………After independence,
however, the loco running staff’s work was uniformly classified as “continuous”
. By the 1960s, with intensified
timetables and the spread of dieselization loco running staff were often on
duty up to twenty hours at a time.”
*WAGE EROSION OF LOCO RUNNING STAFF
Page 78:- “Since Independence, the loco running staff
had seen their wages droop dramatically in relation to other railway
workers. In the twenty years since 1947, station masters and assistant station
masters had seen their pay increased by three hundred and four hundred per
cent, signal inspectors by six hundred per cent and guards by nearly four
hundred per cent. Drivers and firemen,
on the other hand, had only had a ninety to one hundred per cent increase
during the same period.”
*NO BRIDE FOR LOCO PILOTS !
Page 80:- “For
example, the chart said, before 1947 the
driver was “accepted as the backbone of the railways, and his back bone was
strong”. After 1947 he was “just spoken
of as the backbone of railways and he is left with hunch back”. Before 1947 “the words of driver was gospel
truth” and he had “high public regard”, but after 1947 there was “none to care
for his words” and he had “no regard”. Perhaps
worst of all, before 1947 the “public were competing to marry a Driver, whilst
after 1947 it was very hard to get a bride”.”
*RESOLUTIONS, TRADING & POLITICAL SURVIVAL OF FEDERATIONS
Page 85-86:- “The Recognized unions had become so
concerned with maintaining their Recognized status that they had ceased to be
effective instruments through which workers’ interests could be
represented. Voicing the cynicism felt by many workers about the various conferences
and meetings held by the NFIR and AIRF, one worker asked, “Were these for the
purpose of merely passing resolutions?
Or for the purpose of trading? Or
for the purpose of gaining popularity for their political cum-Trade Union
leaders survival in the political arena?”.
This reflected the common feeling that the leaders of the Recognized
unions were not only ineffectual but corrupt, a feeling encapsulated in the
sardonic joke that the railway “ ‘Trade Unions’ have been turned into ‘Trading
Unions’ ”.
Encapsulated=To
enclose in or as if in a capsule.
Sardonic=Bitter, scornful or sarcastic.
*FIRST CONFERENCE OF AILRSA
Page 94:- “The
first all-India conference of the united Loco Running Staff Association,
convened in Vijayawada in Andhra Pradesh on 25 and 26 August brought together
four thousand delegates from most areas of the Indian Railways.”
*STRENGTH IS RECOGNITION
Page 185-186:- “………..Most
important of all, the Association won
the Railway Minster’s assent to the introduction of a ten-hour maximum working
day………..This was appreciated even by some in recognised union circles. As one leader was to express it: “One cannot deny that [there was political
pressure]. But one also cannot deny that
the LRSA was in such a tremendous position as to bring to a grinding halt the
train services, at least to the extent of sixty to seventy percent, throughout
India”……..The Association established
the principle that the railway authorities had to negotiate with an
unrecognised union if the union was strong enough. It demonstrated to the rest of the railway
workers that determined, well-organised action could defeat the government’s
special repressive legislations like the Defence of India Rules and the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act.
*NFIR STYLE OF FUNCTIONING
Page 197:- The
National Federation of Indian Railwaymen (NFIR) generally operated on the basis of a patron-client
relationship between union official and member. Its special access to the state through the
Congress Party allowed it to win favours and privileges for individual workers
through personal influence and to gain concessions for groups of workers
through closed-door discussions. The
officials of the NFIR acted not in response to workers’ demands but to their
requests. Individual workers were expected to approach their leadership
respectfully, touch their feet and request mediation. The NFIR leaders expected recognition of
their status as powerful men and usually demanded payment.”
*NFIR – NO FAITH IN STRIKE
Page 198:- “For the NFIR, the loyalty of the worker was
not particularly important. The
Federation could retain a level of formal membership because of its ability to
control patronage. Paying the membership
fee for the NFIR provided the chance of getting access to the services of a
patron……..The worker could well be a member of another union, one to which he
or she might feel genuine commitment. Multiple union membership was a practical
strategy to gain maximum benefit --- a kind of insurance policy……..According to
the NFIR’s philosophy of “constructive trade unionism”, strikes were an
outmoded form of trade union activity.
The NFIR announced: “The slogan of right of strike of the 19th
century when there was no democracy, no adult franchise and feudalism was going
uncontrolled, has no meaning today [in the 1960s]”
*NFIR – RUTHLESS STRIKE-BREAKER
Page 200:- “Workers
showed their rejection of the NFIR’s analysis when they joined the strike
called by the AIRF and other central government unions in July 1960. In the event of such a major strike, the
other face of the NFIR’s “constructive trade unionism” became evident. According to Deven Sen, President of the Hind
Mazdoor Sabha, the police who were
mobilized to break the 1960 strike were assisted by the “INTUC people who not
only opposed the strike but spotted out strikers for arrest and even went in
police jeeps and vans for making arrests”. The NFIR could pretend
labour-management relations in the railways were harmonious, but when strikes did occur the NFIR drew
clear battle lines and became a ruthless strike-breaker.
Page 201:- “Following the 1968 strike, the Railway Board withdrew recognition from the AIRF for over a year.”
*NFIR STRATEGY – WEAKEN WORKERS & REAP ADVANTAGE
Page 209:- “The situation of the NFIR in late 1973 and
early 1974 was an eloquent statement on the relationship between the NFIR and
the railway workers. When workers felt confident of their own
strength, the NFIR felt impotent.
When workers began to take action to win their demands, the NFIR was
pushed to one side. Workers approached
organisations like the NFIR, with their patron-client dynamic, when their own
efforts were unlikely to succeed. Such organisations symbolized and in fact
exploited the powerlessness of the working class. They interacted with workers at the moment of
the workers’ most severe weakness --- as individuals. When confronted with workers at their most
powerful, when they acted collectively, the NFIR’s instinctive reaction was to
crush them. The NFIR was powerful when the workers were weak and their weakness was
in turn perpetuated by the NFIR.”
Eloquent=Speech
or writing that is forceful, fluent etc.
*AIRF – NO PLACE FOR MILITANT WORKERS/AFFILIATES
Page 211:- “At the 1969 Annual Convention, the General Secretary, Priya Gupta, complained
that workers no longer seemed interested inactively supporting the AIRF. By the 1973 Convention he could see that the
reason for the change was that “our
unions have practically degenerated into petition making bodies” ……….As
railway workers’ real incomes fell during the 1960s, activists in the zonal
affiliate unions put increasing pressure on the leadership to call a strike,
while management warned that the consequence of militant action would be loss
of recognition. The AIRF’s response was to act against the pressure from within its own
ranks. Dissidents were expelled and the
elected executives of militant branches were arbitrarily overturned. Militant affiliates such as the Chittaranjan
Locomotive Works Labour Union were disaffiliated from the AIRF………It agreed
to the government’s proposal to defer payment of Dearness Allowance for 1967
until the following year and to forgo Dearness Allowance for the three lakh
casual railway workers.”
Page 215:- The
outcome of the 1968 strike was a disaster for the AIRF. It damaged the Federation’s relations with
management and, following the precedent of the 1960s strike, the Railway Board
withdrew recognition. Only those
affiliates which had withdrawn from the strike were allowed to keep their
recognition. In order to win back
recognition the AIRF had to accept another period of penance.”
*STRIKE BALLOTS; BUT NO STRIKES
Page 216-217:- “Year
after year the AIRF would pass militant resolutions, even hold strike
ballots. But the leadership would always
shrink from action”……….The AIRF leaders had once again, in George Fernandes,
words, “exposed them[selves] before the workers as men who never really meant
what they said, men who were not capable of implementing the decisions they
took, exposed as men of straw”.
*STRIKE BREAKING BY AIRF & CLAIMING BENEFITS
Page 226-227:- “Of all the options, the AIRF felt most
comfortable with an openly hostile response to the category-unions. Despite calls from some quarters for a
“constructive approach” to the issue, most AIRF leaders took up a sterile
oppositional stance. Any activity initiated by the
category-unions was belittled, attacked or undermined………..At the local level,
AIRF leaders would personally attempt to persuade workers not to join the
strike, efforts which were not always free of physical intimidation. Collaboration between management and the AIRF
against the category-unions was commonplace.
According to M.N.Bery, when he was General Manager of the Northern
Railway he would forewarn the recognised unions if he knew that an unrecognised
union intended to demand to see him when he arrived at a station on an
inspection tour. This gave the
recognised union, either the AIRF or NFIR, time to organise a
counter-deputation or demonstration to which Bery could turn in favour of the
one organised by the unrecognised union.
If the unrecognised union insisted on seeing him Bery could, as he put
it, say: “Well, I’ve just had a meeting with the recognised unions on this,
what more is there to discuss?”. The
AIRF was reducing itself to the status of a bodyguard for railway officials but
seemed satisfied to accept the role if it undermined rival unions……….Management
and the recognised unions even resorted to inventing fictitious negotiations as
a way of excluding the category-unions from the official system of industrial
relations. As Namasivayam# candidly described it: The government wanted to
announce something – the pressure was from the Loco Running Staff Association –
that would have been their demand, they would have fought, struggled, went on
strike. But the government was making
the announcement. They would say: ‘In
consultation with the recognised unions…’ to give credit to the recognised
unions. In other words, even when concessions were made to category-unions,
managers would declare that the question had been resolved as a result of
negotiations with the recognised unions.”
#Namasivayam
was the General Secretary of SRMU.
*AIRF: WHY 12HOURS DUTY LIMIT? WE WILL SIGN FOR 14HOURS DUTY!
Page 228:- “It was mentioned in Chapter Two that in the midst of the 1968 firemen’s strike,
when the Firemen’s Council was demanding maximum hours be reduced to twelve,
the Railway Board made a deal with the AIRF for a fourteen-hour day. The AIRF rode the momentum of the firemen’s
strike to gain a concession. The possibility of winning at twelve-hour
day did not seem to concern the AIRF. It
was more interested in taking the credit and preserving its influence than in
having the firemen work shorter hours.
The railway authorities put a great deal of importance on maintaining
these pretences with the recognised unions.
M.N.Bery regretted that his
greatest failure, as Chairman of the Railway Board during the August 1973 loco
running staff strike, was that he could not persuade the Loco Running Staff
Association to have the recognised unions associated with the agreement for a
ten-hour day.”
*LRSGC DESTROYED BY FEDERATIONS
Page 229-231:- The aftermath of 13th August 1973
agreement between the management and the AILRSA: “The
Loco Running Staff Grievance Committee, set up to work out the details of the
ten-hour day, was a formal structure challenging existing institutions. The challenge panicked many officials of the
AIRF. As one official put it: “The ‘de
jure’ recognition granted to [the Loco Running Staff Association] by the Govt.
agreeing to constitute a Committee will have serious repercussions on other
categories.”………..The first meeting of the Committee was to be held in
Madras on 9 September 1973. The AIRF’s
affiliate in the Southern Railway called a demonstration outside the railway
offices to try to stop the meeting from going ahead……..M.N.Bery received the
union’s General Secretary and accepted a protest note from him. Probably
at Bery’s prompting, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu had the meeting cancelled
because a difficult “law and order” situation had been created by the
demonstration. An understandably angered Loco Running Staff Association circulated
copies of a letter between AIRF officials which showed the AIRF had co-operated
with management in organizing the demonstration. The letter assured the organisers that leave
would be granted for the demonstrators and that “you may also make arrangements
with the Divisional authorities for arranging a comfortable journey”. Quite probably the whole affair was planned
by Bery and Namasivayam, who had a close working relationship from the days
when Bery was Member (Staff) of the Railway Board. The AIRF did not appear to be embarrassed by
the revelation of its collaboration with management. Indeed, a similar demonstration was called by
the AIRF union in the Northern Railway outside the Rail Bhavan in New Delhi
when the Grievance Committee met there on 25 September. As will be shown later, the work of the Committee was repeatedly delayed and finally brought to
a standstill partly through the efforts of the recognised unions. The
AIRF obstructed the achievement of a goal for which an important category of
railway workers had been striving for over a decade. To the leadership of the AIRF this was
secondary to preservation of its privileged position. Such a completely negative posture could only
be counter-productive. Standing in the
way of negotiations might succeed in harassing category-unions, but it
increased the unpopularity of the AIRF and heightened its reputation as a tool
of management. The AIRF continued to
drift from crisis to crisis. In the eyes of trade unionists inside and
outside the railways, it had become an impotent organisation. For supporters of the All India Trade Union
Congress the AIRF was “ineffective” and “acquiescing with the
bureaucrats”. The Centre of Indian Trade
Unions considered that it had “virtually surrendered to the Railway
Board”. Even people who were politically
aligned with the leadership, like Socialist Party MP, Madhu Limaye, had come to
the conclusion that the organisation was “virtually moribund”. George Fernandes throught the AIRF was
“moving like a rudderless ship”. Still
more embarrassing, the Chairman of the Railway Board was of the opinion that
the AIRF had become “effete”. It was not
surprising that railway workers looked for alternatives to the impotent
recognised unions as their unresolved grievances continued to mount.”
De jure= By right or legal establishment.
Acquiescing=Consenting
quietly without protest.
Moribund=Dying;
coming to an end; having little or no vitality.
Effete=No
longer able to produce; spent and sterile.
*AIRF – A SECOND NFIR !
Page 234:- “With the growth of a leadership with vested
interests in an inactive union, numbers of AIRF activists began to fear that
the Federation was becoming like a second NFIR.
The pull towards becoming a management-oriented union was also a pull in
the direction of patron-client relations and towards hostility to collective
workers’ action.”
*LEADERS OF FEDERATIONS & AILRSA
Page 462:- “As the trade union movement developed a more
secure place in Indian society, greater numbers of unions were led by officials
who came from the ranks of their industry.
This was particularly true of the railways, at least at the zonal level,
where officials such as Umraomal Purohit from the Western Railway, J.P.Chaubey
fom the Northern Railway, M.Namasivayam from Southern Railway and
A.V.K.Chaitanya from the South Central Railway were all former railway
employees. All these individuals, however, became full-time union functionaries
and never returned to the workplace. The
most pertinent characteristic of the category-unions which marked them out from
the recognised unions was that their leaders were railway workers who pursued
their union work while carrying out their duties as railway employees.”
*SELLERS OF LABOUR-POWER
Page 472-473:- “A union which cannot take its workers out on
strike has little or no power. Or, more
precisely, a union has power only if it can convince an employer that it has
the ability to take its workers out on strike.
The history and reputation of a particular union, or an awareness of the
power of trade unionism as a whole, can persuade an employer to make
concessions to a union on the implicit or explicit threat of withdrawal of
labour. But a union with no history of
action or which has been weakened by factors such as state repression,
management co-option or internal division, will have little capacity to make
its threat of a strike or other industrial action a credible one. Over time, such a union will lose its
capacity to exercise the power inherent in workers’ position as sellers of
labour-power. This study has documented
the decline of the two recognised unions to organisations with little or no
credibility with management and declining support amongst the railway
workers. In particular, the AIRF, which
saw itself as an activist union rather than just a patron-client body like the
Congress-run NFIR, wanted to be taken seriously by railway management and the
government but was unprepared to take the risk of cutting itself loose from the
tentacles of management-controlled institutions. Its repeated unfulfilled promises of strike
action meant that it was no longer believed by either the employer or by the
workers.”
* TITLES ADDED.
YOU ALONE CAN MAKE A CHANGE
Now the history of the Federations,
as above, is before you. You will be able to get more shocking facts if you go
through the above book in detail.
Moreover, the History Committee of the AILRSA is also on the job of
publishing our glorious achievements/history.
In the light of the above narration, it is amply clear that we cannot
expect any loco running staff demands being projected amply by both the
Federations. Are you still encouraging
them by contributing monthly from your salary and remaining as its
member/office-bearer? Please have a
self-introspection and yield to your consciousness.
Au
revoir!
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