Full Press release by NREU

NAIRUTHYA RAILWAY EMPLOYEES UNION

(NREU)

South Western Railway-Reg.No.ALCB-4/DRT/TUA/3/2008-09

PRESS RELEASE ON THE EVE OF SAFETY MARCH BY LOCO PILOTS.

HUMPI MISHASP 26 KILLED

*       SPONSORED BY DIVISIONAL OPERATIONS MANAGER?

*       GROOMED BY DIVISIONAL SAFETY OFFICER, DIVISIONAL COMMERCIAL MANAGER, DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, DIVISIONAL ELECTRICAL ENGINEER?

                                                AND

*       MASTERMINDED BY DIVISIONAL RAILWAY MANAGER?

IT’S NOT A HUMAN FAILURE! IT’S A FAILURE ON THE PART OF BANGALORE DIVISIONAL AUTHORITIES AND SYSTEM FAILURE!!

**********

1.      The Divisional Operations Manager DID NOT comply with RB guide lines and FAILED TO POST ADDITIONAL ASM AT PENUKONDA STATION.  

The Joint Procedural Order issued Shri. Sri.V.K.Roy, E.D (Traffic Transportation), and Sri. Mahesh Kumar, ED (Signal) of the Railway Board vide their circular bearing NO. 2002/Sig/P1/1 dt. 09.07.2002 stipulate that if the line capacity utilization (MEANING DENSITY OF TRAFFIC) has reached 85%  an Additional ASM/Group ‘C’ traffic shall be provided in ach shift for doing multifarious work carried out by the Station Master.

The shocking revelation is that the DENSITY OF TRAFFIC at Penukonda station is 145.13% towards Yelahanka on the one direction and 110.3% towards Dharmavaram on the other direction. But the Divisional Operations Manager (DOM) who is empowered to take a decision to post Additional Station Master failed to take a decision in time and did not post Additional Station Master RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF 26 INNOCENT PASSENGERS. Due to the non implementation of the Railway Board Order even after one decade only one SM was working at Penukonda at the time of accident.

Thus the SM was performing TWO STATION MASTES’ DUTY and working under tremendous pressure. and it was very much required to post Additional ASM at PKD. But no Additional ASM was posted to Penukonda at the time. This is one of the prime reasons for the accident. The letter under reference was   issued in the year 2002 and even after one decade no concrete steps were taken to ameliorate the issue. In the adjacent Southern Railway a large number of Additional ASM posts have been created. But in Bangalore Division and in South Western Railway NO CONCIOUS EFFORTS WERE MADE to post Additional Station Masters till date.

2.      The Divisional Operations Manager did not post a SUPEVISOR GRADE STATION MASTER WITH SUFFICINT SERIVCE to Penukonda as INCHARAGE STATION MASTER since May 2011 though IT IS A JUNCTION.

It is a convention and time tested PROCEDURE followed in Indian Railways to post a SENIOR STATION MASTER WITH SUFFICIENT SERVICEE TO BE IN CHARGE of JUNCTION STATIONS.

Penukonda is a Junction with trains running in THREE DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS-towards Bangalore City, towards Secunderabad and Sri Sai Sathya Nilayam (that is Puttapparthi).  Till May 2011 one Shri.Raja Rao in the status of STATION MASTER GRADE ONE with 33 YEARS OF SERVICE was working as INCHARGE Station Master. But he was transferred to Hindupur during May 2011 and EVER SINCE ONE SHRI.SRINIVASA RAO was ordered to be in charge of Penukonda. The Station Master is a inexperienced with hardly seven years of service. And just two months back the DOM has posted one a Station Master in the status of Station Master Grade one who has put in less than 10 years of service in Railways.

THUS A MAJOR JUNCTION STATION WAS LEFT TO THE CARE OF INEXPERIENCED STATION MASTERS WITH LESS THAN TEN YEARS OF SERVICE AS STATION MASTER IN CHARGE CULMINATING IN THE ACCIDENT AND THE DEATH OF 26 PASSENGERS.

NOT POSTING A SENIOR STATION MASTER WITH SUFFICIENT SERVIDCE IN THE STATUS OF SM GRADE ONE IS a serious administrative lapse committed by Divisional Operations Manager causing the major calamity.

3.     NOT DEPUTING BOOKING CLERK TO ISSUE TICKETS IN THE NIGHT SHIFT FOR THE MUSLIM ANNUAL URS (FESTIVAL/JATHRA) BY DIVISIONAL COMMERCIAL MANAGER LED TO THE ACCIDENT.

“The roadside station staff performing simultaneous, operating and commercial duties get highly stressed due to role overload, role conflict and unreasonable pressure.”

The current accident was WELL ENUMERATED and DEFINED by Shri. Vinesh Kumar (Executive Director/Traffic) in his circular bearing No.2002/TG/V/IO/ PA/110/CRS BC Dt.24.05.2004. The term that has relevance is ‘ROLE CONFLICT’ which means doing conflicting duties at a time simultaneously. The accident could have been prevented despite the Loco Pilot passing the signal at danger had the SM/s attention WAS NOT DIVERTED IN ISSUING TICKETS AND ANSWERING THE QUERIRS OF THE HUNDREDS OF PILGRIMS.

The accident has taken place on 22.05.2012 and from 22.4.2012 to 22.05.2012 A FAMOUS ANNUAL ISLAMIC FESTIVAL known as ‘BABA URS’ was going on in the HISTORIC DHARGA located in the town of Penukonda for which thousands of devotees came to Penukonda from all over Karnataka.

Normally every year a Commercial Clerk would be deputed to Penukonda from Head Quarters, that is Bangalore to take care of issuing tickets in the night shift. Even last year, 2011, a Commercial Clerk was delegated to Penukondas. But this years NO COMMERCIAL CLERK WAS DEPUTED TO PENUKONDA TO WORK IN THE NIGHT LIKE THE PRECEDING YEARS. This distraction is one strong factor for the accident, directly similar to the Dumri-halt accident that has been quoted by Shri.Vinesh Kumar in his circular dated 24.05.2004.

A total number of 30,958 passengers were dealt at Penukonda during this year ‘Urs’ (in local terms known as JHATHRA, meaning festival or carnival) resulting in a net collection of Rs.7, 81,654 (No. of tickets 24,174) which is almost twice the average earning of PKD passenger booking.

Though the actual number of tickets were not much at the material time there were hundred of passengers in the waiting hall adjunct continuously distracting with their queries.

NOT DELEGATING A COMMERCIAL CLERK TO HANDLE THE FAMOUS ANNUAL MUSLIM URS DEVOTEES DURING THE NIGHT TIME WAS A MAJOR CAUSE FOR THE ACCIDENT UNLIKE THE PREVIOUS YEAR WHEN A COMMERCIAL CLERK WAS DELEGATED TO WORK IN THE NIGHT SHIFT IN THE TICKET BOOKING COUNTER.

The distraction caused by the pilgrims resulted in loss of concentration on the part of the SM and he did not alter leading to a free line with the result Humpi Express rammed into the stabled goods train on Road 2 when the Loco Pilot of 16591 passed the Home signal of Penukonda at danger.

4.       NON PRIVISION OF FOOT OVER BRIDGE BY DIVISIONAL ENGINEER.

The SM did not receive Humpi straight to Road 3 (that is Platform No.2) though it was free and he planned to receive it on Platform NO.1 after the departure of 165953 express.

Penukonda has two passenger platforms divided by one goods line that does not have a platform for passengers since it is meant only for receiving Goods trains. When such situations arise where two platform lines are separated by a goods line to facilitate the passengers to traverse from one platform to the other it is essential as an amenity and safety measures to provide a Foot Over Bridge. Though there was provision for a FOB in the construction plan the FOB was not at built at Penuknoda. Earlier on a few occasions passengers had made complaints on the SM on duty whenever the trains were received on Platform No.2 More over on that day the in between line was occupied by the Goods train and absolutely there was no way for the passengers to come to Platform Number one side to go to town.

Because the FOB was not built by DIVISIONAL ENGINEER (CONSTRUCTION) the SM was not inclined to signal the Humpi Express to Platform No.2 which was free and THEREFORE NOT PROVIDING FOB IS ONE BASIC CAUSE OF ACCIDENT. More over due to festival more children and women passengers were expected by the train and the SM did not want to earn the wrath of the pilgrims/devotees.

THUS NON CONSTRUCTION OF A FOB IS AN IMPORTANT CAUSE FOR THE ACCIDENT.

5.        NON PROVISION OF PLATFORM LIGHTS FOR PF-2 BY DIVISIONAL ELECTRICAL ENGINEER.

On par with Para 4 is THE NON PROVISION OF ELECTICAL LIGHTS ON ROAD 3/PLATFORM NO.2 was another important reason that made the SM panicky to receive Humpi Express on Platform No.2 without detaining it in the Home signal since lot of children and women pilgrims were coming from all directions for the ANNUAL MUSLIM FESTIVAL and the non provision of lighting on Platform No.2 was a dreaded factor and a major cause of the accident. Consequently many times robbery had taken place whenever trains were dealt on Rd.3/Platform No.2. Already there are complaints against the SMs for receiving Passenger carrying trains on Platform No.2

6.     NON PROVISION OF AUDIO/VISUAL WARNING GADGET TO HIGHLIGHT AND DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE SM THAT POINT WAS NOT SET AGAISNT THE OCCUPIED LINE.

In the light of Santhia accident (as explained in the BRIEF TO PRESS NOTE) the RDSO of Indian Railways should have made it mandatory to provide some audio or visual warning device (like a buzzer of flickering light) in the SIGNALLING PANEL PROVIDED IN THE STATION if the SM fails to reverse point to a free line on arrival of a train.

Or else the Railway Authorities could have provided an AUTOMATIC REVERSER (like the UPS system where the UPS picks up when the BESCOM electrical supply fails) to reverse the point to a free line on complete arrival of a train.

7.     LARGE NUMBER OF CAUSALITIES WAS CAUSED BY FIRE AND NOT BY COLLISSION.

A serious factor that shall not be lost sight is the fact that 24 out of the 26 causality WAS CONSEQUNT ON BURN INJURIES AND NOT DUE TO DIRECT INJURY ARISING OUT OF COLLISSION.

Thus only two died due to the collision and heavy causality could have been not there at all if the fire hadn’t broken out due to the spilt petrol from the two wheelers loaded in the luggage compartment.

The causality rose high due not decanting the petrol before loading the two wheelers and this is the major cause of causalities being on the higher side. This deserves special attention of the media since the lives of 24 innocent passengers could have been prevented if two wheelers with petrol hadn’t been loaded in the luggage portion of the SLR.

G.Rajan,

Legal Advisor, NREU.

Mob: 8861007227 & 9448293295.